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Insider Trading and the EEC: Harmonization of 
the Insider Trading Laws of the Member States 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1973, Manuel Cohen, a former chairman of the U.S. Securities and Ex-
change Commission, envisioned the scenario of a U.S. investor in Kansas buying 
the stock of a small Swedish computer software company as easily as a U.S. 
citizen might invest in the stock of a U.S. company such as I.B.M.l Cohen's vision 
of an international securities market is becoming a reality today. Companies 
consider national boundaries less meaningful in the quest for and supply of 
capital.2 Investors are eager to invest in foreign securities3 and the demand for 
capital has increased around the world. 4 
The formation of an international securities market,5 however, cannot occur 
without consistent regulation designed to ensure the continued integrity of the 
market system and the protection of all investors.6 Specifically rules dealing with 
the generally considered abusive practice of insider trading will have to be 
consistent from one nation to the next to protect all investors. 7 
Insider trading occurs when certain individuals,s after obtaining non public 
I. Cohen, Toward An Internatitmal Securities Market, 5 LAW & POL'y IN INT'L Bus. 357, 357 (1973). 
2. See Thomas,lnternationalizatitm of the World's Capital Markets: Can the SEC Help Shape the Future?, 15 
INT'L L. & POL. 55, 56 (1982). According to Thomas, former chairperson of the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), "As developed nations of the world enter the 'post-industrial age; 
dramatic changes in world commerce, communications and transportation ... are leading inevitably to 
the internationalization of the world's capital markets. Investors are engaging in securities transactions 
in all parts of the globe, corporations are crossing their native borders to raise capital in distant foreign 
markets and new financial products are being offered around the world." 
3. Cohen, supra note I, at 383. According to Cohen, two factors have caused the growth of investor 
interest in foreign securities. The first factor is the desire of investors for satisfactory investment 
performance, irrespective of the market or national economy involved. The second factor is investment 
mobility, i.e. countries generally limit foreign direct investment but are willing to permit their residents 
to purchase new issues of foreign securities and to trade in listed securities in foreign secondary 
markets. Id. at 383-84. 
4. Id. at 376. 
5. The internationalization of the world securities markets may be achieved either through the 
structure of a central marketplace or through a simpler system of coexistence and cooperation among 
existing national securities markets. Id. at 390. 
6.Id. 
7. Wymeersch, From Harmonizatitm to Integratitm in the European Securities Markets, 3 J. OF COMPo CORP. 
L. & SEC. REG. I, 19 (1981). 
8. These certain individuals are termed insiders. The definition and usage of the term "insider" in 
the securities laws varies from one nation to the next. For the British definition see infra notes 196-208 
and accompanying text; for the French definition see infra notes 209-14 and accompanying text; for the 
German definition, see infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text. 
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information that relates to the value of a corporation's publicly held securities, 
trade on that information to profit when the information is eventually disclosedY 
Insider trading threatens the proper functioning of the stock markets by un-
dermining the equality of opportunity between investors and eroding their 
confidence in the market. lo Most commentators also consider insider trading to 
be unjust. lI Current insider trading regulations, therefore, have attempted to 
compensate injured parties, to punish wrongdoers, to compel disgorgement of 
their ill-gotten profits, and to induce rapid public disclosure of material inform a-
tion. 12 
Because of the internationalization of the world's capital markets, the prob-
lems caused by insider trading have rapidly expanded to all countries which have 
companies listed on a national stock exchange. 13 Insider trading legislation varies 
tremendously, however, from country to country. Among the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) member states,I4 only France l5 and the United 
Kingdom 16 have such legislation. 17 West Germany relies upon a voluntary code. 18 
Belgium and the Netherlands are considering legislation. 19 No specific legislation 
in this area currently exists in seven of the ten member states.20 
9. Cruickshank, Insider Trading and the EEC, 10 INT'L Bus. LAW. 345,345 (1982). 
10. Karjala, Statutory Regulation of Insider Trading in Impersonal Markets, DUKE L.]. 627, 627 (1982). 
II. For example, according to Professor Wang's Law of Conservation of Securities, which states that 
securities purchased by insiders are no longer held by outsiders, insider trading is unjust because it 
deprives the former outside shareholder of the benefits of the subsequent price rise when the good 
news is announced. Wang, Trading on Material Nonpublic Information on Impersonal Markets: Who is 
Harmed, and Who Can Sue Whom Under SEC Ruk JOb-57, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 1217, 1234-35 (1982). 
12. Karjala, supra note 10, at 629. 
13. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
14. The ten current member states of the EEC are Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, France, 
Italy, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, and Greece. Cruickshank, supra note 9, 
at 345. 
15. Law No. 70-1208, Dec. 23, 1970, art. 4, 1970 JOURNAL OFFICIEL [hereinafter cited as].0.Jll,98I, 
1971 DALLOZ-SIREY, LEGISLATION [hereinafter cited as D.S.L.JI7 adding Art. 10-1 to Ordinance No. 
67-833, Sept. 28,1967 ].0.9589,1967 D.S.L. 42, adding Art. 162-1 to Law No. 66-537, July 24,1966, 
1966 ].0.6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265 [hereinafter cited as Art. 10-1]. 
16. The Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73. 
17. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 345. 
18. Id. For the complete text of the insider trading guidelines see BAUMBACH-DuDEN-HoPT, HAND-
ELGESETZBUCH (mit Nebengesetzen Ohne Seerecht 25th ed. 1982), NEBENGESETZE No. 16; E. SGHWARK, 
BORSENGESETZ, Annex II at 481 (1976). 
19. H. BLOOMENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 1-98 (1983). 
The Belgian Banking Commission, which has regulatory power over the banking and securities 
industries in Belgium, recognizes that insider trading has been a continuing problem in Belgium. The 
Commission has been reluctant, however, to exercise jurisdiction in that area beyond articulating the 
dangers of insider trading in its publications. See B. RIDER & H. FRENCH, THE REGULATION OF INSIDER 
TRADING 254 (1979). In the Netherlands, the Ministry of Justice appointed an Expert Committee in 
Company Law Reform to examine and make recommendations on insider trading. Id. at 247. In 1973, 
the Committee published a memorandum on insider trading which recommended that insider trading 
be made a criminal offense. Id. To date no legislative action has been taken in this area. See H. 
BLOOMENTHAL, supra, at 8-28 for the text of the Committee's recommendations. 
20. Most of the member states have provisions in their regulations which might be relevant to a 
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French insider trading legislation did not exist until 1967,21 at which time 
France enacted a law requiring complete disclosure. 22 This law failed to curb 
insider trading23 so the French Parliament criminalized insider trading in 1970.24 
In the United Kingdom, Parliament enacted insider trading legislation in 1980.25 
In West Germany, insider trading is regulated by a series of recommendations 
that a committee of experts formulated in 1970.26 The Committee of Stock 
Exchanges and the Ministry of Finance modified these recommendations In 
1976.27 
The EEC has the potential to playa major role in the internationalization of 
the securities markets. The EEC provides a vehicle by which this goal of uniform 
regulation may be achieved. By the use of its council directive,28 the EEC has 
made the laws of its member states consistent in many areas. 29 The EEC has 
presently turned its attention to the area of insider trading and is working on a 
greater or lesser extent in cases of insider trading. See RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 247-76. These 
provisions are generally inadequate, however, in regulating insider trading and must be distinguished 
from legislation or recommendations specifically aimed at eradicating insider trading, such as the U.S. 
regulations discussed infra notes 43-89 and accompanying text; the British regulations discussed infra 
notes 196-208, 235-36, 254-65 and accompanying text; the French regulations discussed infra notes 
209-14, 238-45, 266-71 and accompanying text; and the German regulations discussed infra notes 
215-23,246-51,272-74 and accompanying text. 
21. Prior to 1967, the French did not perceive insider trading as a problem in France; it was a 
practice customarily enjoyed by insiders for the benefit of themselves, their relatives and their friends. 
Tunc, A French Lawyer Looks at American Corporations Law and Securities Regulation, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 
759 (1982). 
22. Ordinance No. 67-833, Sept. 28,1967, art. 8,1967 ].0.9589,1967 D.S.L. 42, adding Art. 162-1 
to Law No. 66-537, July 24, 1966, 1966 ].0.6402, 1966 D.S.L. 265, translated and reprinted in FRENCH 
LAW ON COMMERCIAL COMPANIES (CCH) 37, 87 (1971). Under the 1967 ordinance, criminal sanctions 
and forfeiture of profits were not imposed unless the person failed to report a trade. See Hawes, Insider 
Trading Law DroeWpments: An International Analysis, 14 LAW & POL'y 1NT'L Bus. 335 at 342 (1982). 
23. Tunc, supra note 21, at 762. 
24. Art. 10-1, supra note 15. 
25. The Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22 §§ 68-73. There had been public demand for insider trading 
laws in the United Kingdom since 1973 but it took the government three different attempts to get the 
legislation enacted. See Hawes, supra note 22, at 337, 338. 
26. Zahn, Regulation of Insider Trading in the Federal Republic of Germany , 2 INT'L Bus. LAW. 92 (1974). 
The Federal Minister of Economic Affairs in Germany established a committee to examine the securi-
ties laws in 1968. This committee, known as the Committee of Stock Exchange Experts, decided to 
examine the problem of insider trading and subsequently appointed a special subcommittee chaired by 
Professor Wolfgang Stutzel to conduct a study. In 1970, the Committee of Stock Exchange Experts and 
the Federal Minister approved the report and recommendations made by the special subcommittee in a 
document entitled Recommendation for the Solution of the So-called Insider Problems. See RIDER & FRENCH, 
supra note 19, at 245. For a discussion of the substance of the recommendations, see infra notes 215-23, 
246-51, 272'74 and accompanying text. 
27. RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 245. The 1976 rules made the former guidelines more 
rational, practical and flexible. For example, one reform was to broaden the definition of insider. See 
infra notes 215-23 and accompanying text for a discussion of the German definition. 
28. The Council directive is a frequently used type of EEC legislation. See infra note 139 and 
accompanying text. 
29. See infra notes 157-77 and accompanying text for the EEC's work in the area of company law 
harmonization. 
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directive that would harmonize the British, French, and West German ap-
proaches to insider trading.30 This Comment begins with an examination of the 
growing problem of insider trading throughout the world. The "uthor then 
discusses the United States approach to regulating insider trading, and presents 
the need for an international approach to this problem. After recounting briefly 
the history, organization, and aims of the EEC, the author presents the EEC's 
current harmonization program in the area of corporate law and shows how 
insider trading legislation is consistent with the EEC's current work in the 
corporate area. In addition the current British, French, and German insider 
trading regulation will be examined paying particular attention to the three 
problem areas identified by the EEC: the definition of "insider," the definition of 
"price-sensitive information," and the restrictions placed on insiders. The author 
also discusses the EEC's current views on each problem area. In the next section, 
the author analyzes each country's method of enforcement. Finally, the author 
concludes that international coordination in this area is not only desirable but 
necessary and that the EEC presents a proper vehicle for the attainment of this 
objective. 
II. THE GROWING NEED FOR REGULATION OF INSIDER TRADING 
A. The Problem of Insider Trading 
Insider trading is not a new phenomenon. Even before the advent of imper-
sonal exchanges,31 the common law sought to prevent unfair dealing by impos-
ing on sellers and purchasers of securities in face-to-face transactions a duty to 
disclose all material information of which they had personal knowledge.32 Unfor-
tunately, with the rise oflarge national impersonal exchanges, insider trading has 
become more common.33 In fact, the persistent phenomenon, both in the United 
States and abroad, of significant price movement in a corporation's stock prior to 
announcements of important corporate developments indicates that insider 
trading occurs frequently.34 
Most courts, legislators, and commentators agree that insider trading is unde-
30. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 345. 
31. The term "impersonal exchanges" refers to the national stock exchanges and to the active 
portions of the over-the-counter market. Transactions on impersonal exchanges are different from 
face-to-face transactions, in which buyer and seller negotiate directly with one another. Karjala, supra 
note 10, at 627 n.3. 
32. Sorin, The Regulatirm of Trading by Insiders and Obligatirms to Disclnse in the United States, 2 INT'L Bus. 
LAW. 81, 88 (1974). 
33. The problem of insider trading has recently worsened. Between 1978 and 1981 the SEC pressed 
charges in 39 cases involving more than 80 individuals and institutions. This was roughly the same 
volume of cases and defendants as in all the preceding four decades of the agency's existence. Louis, The 
Unwinnable War on Insider Trading, FORTUNE July 13, 1981, at 72. 
34. Hawes, supra note 22, at 336. 
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sirable and should be regulated35 because it destroys investor confidence in 
capital markets.36 Proponents of insider trading regulation argue that such 
regulation is justified on moral grounds37 and is suggested by the rules relating to 
the fiduciary duty of agents to employees.38 Whatever the justification is for the 
regulation, cases of insider trading are still widespread and are growing both in 
the United States and abroad. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that while 
many stock markets are becoming increasingly international,39 the laws of the 
many nations of the world remain inconsistent with regard to insider trading.40 
Fortunately several nations recently have enacted or are considering insider 
trading legislation. Of the countries that regulate insider trading, the U.S. 
approach is the most sophisticated and effective,41 and other countries often 
model their legislation upon the U.S. legislation.42 
B. The U.S. Approach to the Problem oj Insider Trading 
The United States system of federal securities regulation is based on the 
principle of disclosure.43 U.S. companies that issue securities must provide pro-
spective investors with a prospectus44 pursuant to the Securities Act of 193345 
35. Karjala, supra note 10, at 627. See also H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 1-88, 89. 
36. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 1-89. See also Hetherton, Insider Trading and the Logic of the 
Law, 1967 WIse. L. REV. 720, 733. The notion behind this argument is that investors will shy away from 
the stock markets if they feel that others are trading on the basis of special private information to which 
the "outside investor" does not have access. See Hetherton, supra, at 720. This equality of information is, 
of course, a legal fiction since some investors will always have more information than others. Id. 
At least one commentator argues that insider trading is desirable. See H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING 
AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). In essence, Manne argues that insider trading is desirable because it 
constantly moves the market price of a given stock towards a level that reflects its value in relation to the 
prices of other issues. Id. at 100-01. 
37. See, e.g., 2 T. FRANKEL, THE REGULATION OF MONEY MANAGERS 565 (1978). This idea is also 
expressed by Professor Cary, former chairperson of the SEC: "[IJntimacy demands restraint lest the 
uninformed become exploited," In re Cady, Roberts &: Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961). 
38. Hetherton, supra note 36, at 731. An agent's use of his principal's assets for his own personal gain 
creates unjust enrichment and constitutes a breach of fiduciary responsibility. An insider's use of 
corporate inside information, considered a corporate asset, for his own gain would also seem to violate 
his fiduciary duty to the corporation. 
39. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
40. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. 
41. Hawes, supra note 22, at 396. See also Tunc, supra note 21, at 759. 
42. Tunc,supra note 21, at 759. For example, French securities law is almost entirely inspired by U.S. 
law. The French Commission des Operations de la Bourse is modeled after the SEC. Id. 
43. Rasmussen, An Overview of Insider Trading Laws in the United States, 9 INT'L Bus. LAw. 389,389, 
(1981). There are two distinctly different philosophies that may underlie a country's system of securities 
regulation. The first is the idea of regulation; the second is the idea of disclosure. Under a system based 
on regulation, the laws seek to proscribe and describe substantive conduct, to which end government 
officials are empowered to make substantive decisions for the benefit of investors. Id. Under a system of 
disclosure, the government regulates the type and timing of data that must be provided to investors but 
leaves the actual investment to the investors themselves. Id. 
44. The term "prospectus" is defined in 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10). It denotes any specific communication 
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[1933 Act]. Additionally, the Securities Exchange Act of 193446 [1934 Act] 
mandates that companies listed on a national securities exchange issue periodic 
public reports about their operations.47 In any required disclosure document, the 
basic standard for disclosure is one of materiality, i.e., all facts necessary to make 
an informed judgment must be disclosed.48 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) is responsible for administer-
ing and enforcing the federal securities laws.49 Of these laws, two principal 
sections pertain to insider trading: section 16(b )50 and rule lOb_55l of the 1934 
Act.52 
1. Section 16(b) 
Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act contains the only provIsions in the federal 
securities laws that expressly prohibit insider trading.53 Under 16(b), insiders54 
are liable for any profits obtained through short-term trading55 in their com-
panies' securities. 56 Any profit obtained by the insider in violation of 16(b) must 
be disgorged to the company.57 This liability is absolute, and thus requires no 
showing of actual abuse of inside information.58 The theory behind 16(b), and 
that an issuer sends or gives to a prospective buyer that conforms to the requirements of the relevant 
1933 Act section. 
45. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77bbbb (1982). 
46. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78111 (1982). 
47. 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1982). This provision of the 1934 Act also applies to any company having at least 
500 shareholders and S 1 million in total assets regardless of whether the company is listed on an 
exchange. /d. 
48. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), Ctrt. denied, 394 U.S. 976 
(1969). For a discussion of this case, see infra notes 69-73 and accompanying text. 
49. 15 U.S.C. § 78d (1982). The SEC consists of five appointed members and is an independent 
non-partisan regulatory agency. Jd. 
50. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1982). 
51. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). 
52. Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1982), under the Securities Act of 1933, also regulates insider 
trading. Adopted in 1972 by the SEC, it attempts to create some safe harbor certainties for sales of an 
issuer's securities by insiders and by any other security-holders who had acquired their securities 
directly from the issuer in a non-registered transaction. For an extended discussion of rule 144, see 
Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 392-93. 
53. H. BLOOMENTHAL, 1983 SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 262 (1983) [hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK]. 
54. An insider, for 16(b) purposes, is an officer or director of a company with a class of equity 
securities registered under the 1934 Act, or the beneficial owner of 10 percent or more of such 
registered class of equity securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982). 
55. "Short-term" is defined under the 1933 Act as occurring within a period of six months. 15 U .S.C. 
§ 78p(b) (1982). 
56. Jd. 
57. Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 390. This profit is considered a company asset. Jd. The SEC has no 
authority to enforce section 16(b), although it may adopt exemptions to the rule. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) 
(1982). An action under section 16(b) must be brought by the corporation or a shareholder. Jd. 
Disclosure of all insider transactions in shares is provided through monthly SEC publications. This data, 
however, is obtained from reports filed by the insiders themselves. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1982). 
58. HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 262. 
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hence the reason for the absolute liability, is that an insider's short-term trading 
in the securities of his company involves a high risk that the insider might use 
nonpublic information. 59 
While section 16(b) may be effective in regulating short-term trading within 
the U.S., its effectiveness in protecting U.S. investors abroad is questionable. U.S. 
courts are able to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction to recover short-term 
profits from a non-U .S. insider if both the purchases and sales are transacted in 
the U.S. market.60 Subject-matter jurisdiction may not exist, however, if the 
non-U.S. insider transacted the purchases and sales exclusively on foreign ex-
changes even if the company is listed on a U.S. exchange.61 
2. Rule lOb-5 
While section 16(b) applies only to transactions made over the course of six 
months, rule lOb-5 is applicable to any transaction. Rule lOb-5 requires an 
insider to disclose all non public material facts of which he has knowledge to the 
other party to the transaction whenever the insider buys or sells securities in his 
company.62 The scope of lOb-5 has developed through a voluminous body of 
case law.63 The application of rule lOb-5 is limited to cases in which the plaintiff 
either bought or sold securities.64 It is also unavailable for all allegedly fraudu-
lent conduct of insiders, but only for such insider conduct that has a "connection 
with" securities transactions.65 
Rule lOb-5 does not necessarily protect either U.S. or non-U.S. investors when 
inside information is the basis for trading in foreign markets because subject-
matter jurisdiction does not exist under lOb-5 unless the defendant utilized some 
means of interstate commerce.66 In general, U.S. courts have applied rule lOb-5 
to international securities transactions if: significant activities occurred in the 
United States in connection with a transaction having consequences solely out-
side of the United States (e.g., affecting only non-U.S. investors), or activities 
59. Rasmussen, supra note 43. at 390. 
60. See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denUid, 394 U.S. 975 (1969). 
61. Nathan, Trading in Multiple Markets, 4 J. COMPo CORP. L & SEC. REG. 1,33 (1982). See Wagman v. 
Astle, 308 F. Supp. 497 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
62. 17 C.F. R. § 240.10b-5 (1982). Rule IOb-5 was promulgated under section lO(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 which provides that it shall be unlawful for any person: 
[tjo use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may 
proscribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors. 
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1982). 
63. While an extended discussion of the case law pertaining to rule 10b-5 is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, the principal cases are discussed infra at notes 68-85 and accompanying text. 
64. 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5. 
65. Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 393. 
66. See Sinva v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 F.R.D. 385, 386 (S.D. N.Y. 1969). 
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took place solely outside the U.S. in connection with a transaction having sub-
stantial effect within the United States.67 
3. U.S. Case Law Pertaining to Rule lOb-5 
Because the language of lOb-5 is quite general,68 the development of the 
substance of lOb-5 has been primarily through case law.69 S.E.C. v. Texas Gulf 
Sulphur Co. was one of the seminal cases construing rule lOb-5's application to 
transactions occurring on an impersonal exchange. While the Second Circuit's 
opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur is notable for several reasons/o it is particularly 
known for its articulation of the "disclose or abstain" rule. 71 Under this rule, 
people privy to material nonpublic information cannot buy or sell the security 
until the information has been appropriately disseminated .72 The standard of 
materiality developed in Texas Gulf Sulphu'f pertained to the likely impact of the 
information on the market price of the security. The court considered the 
information material if to a reasonable investor it would affect market value.73 
In Chiarella v. United States/4 the Supreme Court expanded the definition of 
insider to include outsiders standing in some type of fiduciary relationship to the 
sellers or purchasers of the company's securities. 75 The Court held that a printer 
who traded on the basis of information obtained from decoded tender offer 
documents did not violate rule lOb-5 because he did not stand in a relationship 
with the traders that gave rise to a fiduciary duty.76 Chiarella is also significant 
because the dicta in the opinion indicate that tippees of insiders may be liable 
under rule lOb-5.77 
A third notable case interpreting Rule lOb-5 is Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder. 78 In 
67. Nathan, supra note 61, at 30, 31. 
68. Rule IOb-5 provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(I) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact 
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which 
they were made, not misleading, or 
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a 
fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
69. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). 
70. The opinion is also notable for the Second Circuit's holding that an insider tipper was liable in an 
SEC action for the profits made by his tippees. Jd. at 852-53. 
71. Jd. at 848. 
72. Jd. See also Hawes, supra note 21, at 365. 
73. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 264. 
74. 445 U.S. 222 (1980). 
75. Jd. at 235. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 265. 
76. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235. 
77. Jd. at 230 n.12 (citing Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 495 F.2d at 237-38). 
78. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). 
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Hochfelder, the Supreme Court established that scienter is a requirement for 
liability under 1 Ob-S. 79 Although at least one commentator has indicated that this 
intent can probably be inferred from the conduct of the insider in most in-
stances,80 it is unclear what effect the requirement of scienter will have on lOb-S 
lawsuits. 
The question of damages for a 1 Ob-S violation remains a perplexing one in the 
United States.8! Rule lOb-S, under the 1934 Act, currently provides for civil 
recovery,82 which many other nations, including the United Kingdom and 
France, do not allow. 83 While it is clear that a private claim for damages can be 
asserted by the non-insider in a face-to-face transaction,84 the courts are divided 
on whether to allow recovery to public traders who are not in privity with 
insiders but who happen to be trading in impersonal markets at the same time as 
insiders are trading.85 
The United States has a fairly comprehensive system of federal securities 
regulation. The 1933 Act and the 1934 Act mandate that corporate insiders 
rapidly disclose material corporate developments. Section 16(b) prevents insid-
ers from profiting on short-term trades, and rule 10b-S requires disclosure of 
material inside information prior to any trade. When tippees receive material 
inside information from true insiders, case law indicates that they must either 
abstain from trading or disclose such information to the individuals with whom 
they deal. 86 
The U.S. system, however, is not without its faults. Most significantly, because 
the antifraud language of section 10b-S and rule 10b-S does not pertain directly 
to insider trading, judges are frequently called upon to interpret the language.87 
Since different judicial interpretations lead to inconsistent opinions, some com-
mentators have suggested that Congress adopt a new section to deal specifically 
with insider trading. 88 The U.S. regulations also fail to protect many U.S. inves-
tors abroad.8" 
79. Hoch/elder, 425 U.S. at 214. Scienter may be defined as an intent to deceive, manipulate, or 
defraud. [d. at 193. 
80. HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 265. 
81. See Rasmussen, supra note 43, at 394. 
82. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). See also Hawes, supra note 22, 
at 375. 
83. Hawes, supra note 22, at 375. 
84. Kohler v. Kohler, 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963). 
85. Hawes, supra note 22, at 374. The Second Circuit, for example, has held that plaintiffs are 
harmed and thus may recover when insider trading occurs. See Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner 
& Smith, 495 F.2d 228, 228 (2d Cir. 1974). The Sixth Circuit, however, has concluded that the plaintiffs 
are not harmed by the insider's trading and thus may not recover because the insiders could have 
refrained from trading. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307 (6th Cir. 1976). 
86. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. 
87. FOURTEENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 322 (5. Friedman ed. 1983). 
88. [d. at 319. 
89. See supra notes 60-61, 66-67 and accompanying text. 
160 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. VIII, No.1 
C. The Needfor an International Approach 
The internationalization of the capital markets is already in progress. 90 Al-
though U.S. investors, U.S. issuers, and U.S. markets formerly dominated the 
world's capital markets,»1 currently all capitalist countries in which residents have 
significant savings to invest have stock exchanges.92 While the New York Stock 
Exchange is still preeminent, the stock exchange in Tokyo occasionally trades a 
larger number of sharesY3 In total value of shares traded, the Tokyo Exchange is 
second only to the New York Stock Exchange.94 In terms of market capitaliza-
tion, the New York Stock Exchange ($1.2 trillion) and the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
($341 billion) are followed by the stock exchanges of London ($133 billion), 
Montreal ($113 billion), Frankfurt ($72 billio~), Toronto ($67 billion), and Paris 
($45 billion).95 These stock exchanges provide not only a convenient local market 
for trading in securities of foreign issuers but also, in some instances, a capital 
market for foreign issuers as well. 96 
Unfortunately, the international investor is not consistently protected from 
insider trading throughout the world.97 The legislative approaches to insider 
trading range from nations with no prohibitions98 to nations with elaborate 
regulatory schemes. 99 Approaches differ even among those nations that regulate 
insider trading. Because insider trading legislation is designed to bolster investor 
confidence in the stock markets, investors may be discouraged from trading in 
those markets which are unregulated or poorly regulated. Such discouragement 
90. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text. 
91. See Thomas, supra note 2. at 56. 
92. H. BLOOMENTHAL. supra note 19. at 1-21. The United States today has ten stock exchanges; West 
Germany has eight; France has seven; Switzerland has seven; the United Kingdom. Canada, the 
Netherlands. Belgium, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, Norway. Italy, Singapore, Hong Kong, 
Malaysia. Union of South Africa. Indonesia. Kuwait, Australia. Mexico, Brazil, Israel. Bahrain, and 
Japan all have one or more stock exchanges. /d. 
93. Id. at 1-21. 
94. /d. at 1-22. 
95. INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR. Nov. 1980. at 197. 
96. For example, in France 163 foreign companies are listed on the French stock exchanges. Lee, 
Secrecy Laws and Other Obstacles to International Cooperation, 4J. COMPo CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 63. 67 (1982). 
97. The SEC had been concerned about protecting Americans who invest in companies on foreign 
exchanges. For example, the SEC is particularly concerned that restricting its subpoena powers to any 
place within the United States would prevent it from regulating transactions originating abroad. 
including both trading by foreign nationals and trading by U.S. residents through foreign financial 
intermediaries. See Hawes. supra note 22, at 391. U.S. securities laws will not protect U.S. residents 
outside the United States from fraud committed in other countries. U.S. courts, however, will protect 
U.S. plaintiffs against defendants over whom personal jurisdiction can be asserted. See supra notes 
60-61. 66-67 and accompanying text. See also HANDBOOK, supra note 53, at 427. 
98. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Legislators in many countries fail to proscribe 
insider trading because they consider it to be a legitimate business practice and perquisite. See H. 
BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 1-89. 
99. One such nation is the United States. See infra notes 196-274 and accompanying text for a 
discussion regarding the British, French and West German regulatory schemes. 
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will in turn inhibit the growth of companies in those countries and slow down the 
progress towards internationalizing the markets. 100 
In addition to the implication that the international investor will not be 
protected, the inconsistency of each country's domestic legislation hampers the 
enforcement efforts of nations that have insider trading legislation. 101 Problems 
in enforcement primarily stem from the lack of cooperation between nations, 
particularly when bank secrecy laws are involved. 102 For example, in a number of 
cases the French Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB)103 has had 
difficulties in tracing the identity of persons executing orders on the Paris Stock 
Exchange via the intermediary of Swiss banks.104 The London Stock Exchange 
has had similar difficulties. 105 The use of bank secrecy laws may therefore 
circumvent national legislation. 106 
Since 1977, European nations have increasingly cooperated in investigating 
cases of suspected insider trading. This cooperation is due to the recommenda-
tions embodied in the EEC's Code of Conduct. 107 For example, the Takeover 
Panei lOH in London and the Belgium Banking Commission have been cooperat-
ing with the French COB. l09 Thus, the EEC has the potential to be an appropriate 
and viable vehicle to harmonize existing legislation and encourage cooperation 
among nations. I 10 
100. See generally Thomas, supra note 2, at 62 for an excellent discussion on the need for world 
competition for capital. 
101. See generally Lee, supra note 96, at 87. 
102. For example, Swiss bank secrecy laws prevent banks from divulging information about cus-
tomer transactions unless there is evidence that Switzerland's penal code has been violated. Currently, 
Swiss law prohibits only the passing of inside information to third persons; it does not bar insider 
trading for personal gain although the Swiss government has proposed a law that would make it a 
criminal offense for corporate insiders to use confidential information in securities trading. Wall Street 
Journal, Nov. 17, 1983, at 36, col. I. 
103. The COB is the French equivalent of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission. See infra 
notes 283-85 and accompanying text. 
104. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. See also Hawes, supra note 22, at 380. 
105. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. 
106. One British commentator has noted that the opportunity for clandestine dealing behind a 
foreign bank nominee makes insider trading legislation more symbolic than real. Lee, Insider Trading in 
the UK, 4 J. COMPo CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 389, 390 (1982). 
107. See id. notes 181-82 and accompanying text. 
108. The Takeover Panel, formally known as the City Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, is a 
self-regulatory body established to monitor and regulate takeover transactions. RIDER & FRENCH, supra 
note 19, at 160-61. 
109. Hawes, supra note 22, at 380. The Belgian government's efforts to cooperate with the COB and 
other agencies have culminated with a provision in the Belgian draft law of 1979 that would require a 
Belgian intermediary acting for a person abroad to disclose the identity of the latter in cases of 
suspected insider trading. See Hopt, Insider Trading on the Continent, 4 J. COMPo CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 379, 
383 (1982). 
110. Hopt, supra note 109, at 383. 
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Ill. OVERVIEW OF THE EEC 
A. Briel History 
European integration has been a constant theme in Western Europe since the 
end of World War 11.111 At that time, the leaders of war-torn Europe sought to 
create a lasting peace and to rebuild their nations' economies. liZ Hence, the 
leaders of the signatory states established the European Coal and Steel Commu-
nity (ECSC) in April 1951. 113 The EEC and the European Atomic Energy 
Community (EAEC or Euratom) followed, set up by the two Treaties of Rome of 
March 25, 1957. 114 While each community is a distinct legal entity, 115 all three are 
closely allied. Of the three communities, the EEC is by far the most important 
because it extends into broad spheres of economic and social activity.116 The 
ECSC and the EAEC are extremely specialized. 117 The EEC currently consists of 
ten member states but is facing possible expansion. IIH 
B. Structure 
l. EEC Institutions 
Articles 137 through 209 of the Treaty of Rome establish the four principal 
institutions of the EEC: the Assembly, the Council, the Commission and the 
Court of Justice. ll " The Assembly, now officially the European Parliament, 
consists of 434 representatives. Each member state elects its representatives to 
Ill. A. PARRY & S. HARDY, EEC LAW 3 (1973). 
112. Kearley, An American Researcher's Guide to European Communities Law and Legal Literature, 75 LAW 
LIBR. J. 52,55 (1982). 
113. Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, April 18, 1951,261 U.N.T.S. 
140. See also PARRY & HARDY, supra note 111, at 3. The ECSC was founded on the notion that coal, iron, 
iron ore and steel, along with the labor and capital related to them, ought to be allowed to circulate 
freely within community nations and that tariffs and import quotas on these goods should be abolished 
among member states. The member states were France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
Luxembourg. Kearley, supra note 112, at 56. 
114. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter cited as Treaty of Rome]; Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 
March 25, 1957,298 U.N.T.S. 169. 
115. Although all three European Communities are separate legal entities, they have been governed 
together since April, 1965. The Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European 
Communities, March 25,1957,298 U.N.T.S. 267, provided that all three Communities would share a 
common Assembly and Court. The Treaty Creating a Single Council and a Single Commission, April 8, 
1965, completed the unification of the governance of the three communities. 
116. PARRY & HARDY, supra note Ill, at 9. 
117. Id. 
118. See supra note 14. Spain and Portugal have applied for membership into the EEC. Their entry is 
expected in two to four years. Kearley, supra note 112, at 58. 
119. Treaty of Rome, supra note 112, arts. 137-209,298 U.N.T.S. at 67-85. See also PARRY & HARDY, 
supra note III, at I I. 
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the Assembly directly by universal suffrage. 12o The Assembly is not a parliament 
in the traditional sense of the word because it does not possess direct legislative 
powers. 121 The other institutions must consult the Assembly on certain matters 122 
and in fact do consult it in most legislation. l23 Members of the Assembly debate 
and report on any proposals. Since 1975, the Assembly's chief importance has 
been in the area of the budgetary process. 124 It currently has the power to reject 
or modify the Council's proposed budget, to ask the Council to propose a new 
budget, and to supervise the actual expenditure of approved funds. 125 Overall, 
the Assembly's institutional importance has greatly increased since its origin. 126 
The Council consists of one representative from each member state and acts as 
the legislature for the European Communities. 127 The Treaty of Rome gives the 
Council power to ensure "that the objectives set out in the Treaty are attained" 
and to "ensure the coordination of the general economic policies of the member 
states."12H This grant of power establishes the Council as the primary decision-
making authority in the EEC. Significantly, the Council is the only institution in 
which the members represent the interests of their respective member states. 
Members of the other institutions are obliged to represent the best interests of 
the Community as a whole. 129 With the possible exception of action on antitrust 
matters, the EEC cannot make any new departures or important decisions 
without the agreement of the Council. 130 
The Commission functions as the executive of the Community.131 Its role is 
limited to the enforcement of Community laws and the initiation of proposals for 
the new laws. In fact, most of the Commission's activity is directed toward 
devising proposals for the Council. 132 The Commission consists of fourteen 
persons and a large staff of researchers and administrative assistants. 133 The 
120. Kearley, supra note 112, at 59. 
121. PARRY & HARDY, supra note III, at 22. 
122. For an excellent discussion of the Assembly's consultative function see P. KAPTEYN AND P. V AN 
THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 86 (1973). 
123. Kearley, supra note 112, at 60. 
124. Treaty Amending Certain Financial Provisions of the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities,July 22,1975 arts. 12,13, Treaties Establishing the European Communities [hereinafter 
cited as T.E.E.C.] 897,915,919 (1978). 
125. Treaty Amending Certain Financial Provisions of the Treaties Establishing the European 
Communities, July 22,1975, arts. 12, 13, T.E.E.C. 897, 915, 919. The Assembly rejected the Council's 
first budget proposal in December 1979. See Kearley, supra note 112, at 60 & n.40. 
126. Kearley, supra note 112, at 60. 
127. Treaty of Rome, supra note 114, art. 146,298 V.N.T.S. at 69, as amended by Act Concerning the 
Conditions of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, art. 11,22 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. 1291) 17, 19 (1979). 
128. ld. at art. 145, 298 V.N.T.S. at 69. 
129. E. NOEL, WORKING TOGETHER: THE INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 3 (1979). 
130. PARRY & HARDY, supra note III, at 21. 
131. ld. at 22. 
132. Kearley, supra note 112, at 62, 63. 
133. !d. at 63. Each of the smaller member states appoints one member to the Commission; each 
larger member state appoints two members. !d. The current arrangement for members is not required 
by the Treaty. !d. at 63 n.63. 
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Commission's importance should not be understated; the Council bases virtually 
all important decisions on the Commission's proposals.134 
The Court of Justice consists of eleven judges who are assisted by five 
advocates-general. 135 The Treaty of Rome gives the Court of Justice the author-
ity to "ensure that in the interpretation and application of this Treaty the law is 
observed."136 In carrying out this role, the Court has jurisdiction over controver-
sies between member states regarding the application of Treaty provisions, 
actions the Commission brings against member states for alleged failure to meet 
Treaty obligations, disputes brought by another Community institution or a 
member state concerning the legality of an institution's actions, requests from 
member state courts for preliminary rulings on issues of Community law, and 
non-adversarial proceedings such as the issuance of opinions on the legality of 
proposed agreements with other states or international organizations. 137 Natural 
and legal persons can also bring actions against the EEC and its institutions 
under the Court's administrative jurisdiction. 138 
2. The Council Directive 
The most common type of EEC legislation is the Council Directive. 139 The 
Community has chosen this vehicle to implement most of its legislation in the 
area of company law harmonization.140 A directive is a flexible instrument: 
although it is binding on member states in the result to be achieved, it leaves to 
the individual member states the choice of how to implement the objectives of 
the directive. 141 In effect, the directive is an order issued by the Council requir-
ing member states to bring their national legislation into conformity with the 
directive. 142 
The Commission bears the responsibility for introducing a proposal for con-
sideration as a directive. 143 Once the Commission decides that it should look into 
a particular item, it convenes a working group of experts from the member 
states. At this time the working group consults with interested parties outside of 
134. PARRY & HARDY, supra note III, at 22. 
135. Kearley, supra note 112, at 64. The advocates-general give the justices impartial, expert solu-
tions to cases brought before the Court. Their submissions are usually quite lengthy and contain 
comparative legal information. [d. 
136. Treaty of Rome, supra note 114, at art. 164, 298 V.N.T.S. at 73. 
137. E. STEIN, P. HAY & M. WAELBROEK, EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW AND INSTITUTIONS IN PERSPEC-
TIVE 134 (1976). 
138. Kearley, supra note 112, at 65. 
139. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 345. 
140. /d. 
141. [d. 
142. Schneebaum, The Company Law Harmonization Program of the European Community, 14 LAW & 
POL'y INT'L Bus. 293, 296 (1982). 
143. See supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text. 
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the EEC.144 After obtaining comments from outside parties, the Commission 
adopts a draft text of the proposal and submits it for approval to the Council.!.j5 
The Treaty of Rome mandates that the Council consult the Assembly and the 
Economic and Social Committee l46 before starting a detailed examination of the 
Commission's proposal. After these two bodies give their opinion, the Council 
sets up another working group with representatives from the member states. 
This group's task is to obtain general agreement on the proposal fr~m a technical 
point of view. 147 If problems still exist after the working group's study, members 
of ambassadorial rank from each member state convene to discuss the problems. 
Problems at this point are generally of a political nature. 14~ After all problems 
have been resolved, the Council discusses the proposal and almost always adopts 
it as a Council Directive. 149 Member states then have a certain period of time, 
usually two years, in which to comply with a directive. 150 If a member state fails to 
comply with the directive, the Commission may bring the offending state before 
the Court of Justice which can order compliance. 151 
C. General Aims 
Signatory states of the Treaty of Rome created the EEC to form a common 
economic bloc. 152 In furtherance of this objective, the Treaty of Rome estab-
lished four basic freedoms that the framers considered necessary to form this 
genuine economic community: the freedom of movement of goods, persons, 
services, and capital. 153 An essential aspect of these freedoms is what the Treaty 
of Rome terms the "right of establishment."154 The right of establishment pro-
vides that companies established in one member state should be able to conduct 
business in the other member states and enjoy the same privileges as a local 
companyl55 would enjoy. To enable EEC institutions to realize the right of 
144. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 345. 
145. Id. 
146. The Economic and Social Committee is an advisory body consisting of 156 "representatives of 
the various categories of economic and social activity." Treaty of Rome, supra note 114, at art. 193,298 
V.N.T.S. at 79. In practice representatives are put in three groups: workers, employers, and a general 
interest group. The council, after consultation with the Commission, appoints members to four year 
renewable terms. Id. at art. 194,298 V.N.T.S. at 80. 
147. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 345. 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
150. Id. See also Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 297-99. 
151. Treaty of Rome, supra note 114, at art. 169, 298 V.N.T.S. at 75. 
152. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 345. 
153. Treaty of Rome, supra note 114, at art. 3,298 V.NT.S. at 15-16. See also Cruickshank, supra note 
9, at 345. 
154. Treaty of Rome, supra note 114, arts. 52-58, 298 V.N.T.S. at 37-40. See also Schneebaum, supra 
note 142, at 295. 
155. Silken at, Efforts Toward Harmonization of Business Laws Within the European Economic Community, 
12 INT'L LAW. 835, 836 (1978). 
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establishment, the Treaty of Rome grants the EEC the power to coordinate 
certain safeguards for the protection of members and others with a view toward 
making safeguards uniform throughout the Community. 156 The EEC has con-
structed the program of company law harmonization on this foundation. 
IV. THE EEC's CONCEPT OF HARMONIZATION 
A. The Company Law Harmonization Program 
The company law harmonization program is a comprehensive attempt by the 
EEC to protect employees, shareholders, and the public against certain kinds of 
corporate misconduct. 157 The company law harmonization program is based on 
the right of establishment contained in the Treaty of Rome. l56 The principal 
components of harmonization are coordination, safeguards, protection, and 
equivalence. 13~ Any legislation of a member state designed to protect sharehold-
ers, creditors, customers, potential investors or workers is a candidate for the 
company law harmonization program. 160 
Since harmonization is to be attained through the issuance of directives, 161 an 
examination of the directives currently in force provides a view of the direction 
the EEC has taken in the company law harmonization program. Currently the 
program is composed of ten directives; bve of these directives have been issued 
by the Council, three have been proposed by the Commission and two have not 
yet been submitted by the Commission to the Council. 162 Issued in 1968, the First 
Directive l 6.1 covers three distinct issues: public disclosure, the validity of corpo-
rate acts, and the "nullity" of companies. 164 The Second Directive,I6.'> promul-
gated in 1976, regulates the formation, maintenance, and fluctuation of capital 
in the form of shares of public stock companies, the payment of dividends and 
156. Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 296. The provisions of the Treaty of Rome seek to equalize 
conditions between member states and eliminate wide divergences in national policies. Treaty of Rome, 
supra note 114, at arts. 83-130, 298 U.N.T.S. at 47-66. The provisions of articles 100 through 102 
specifically provide for the harmonization of differing national laws. Id. at arts. 100-02,298 U.N.T.S. at 
54-55. See also PARRY & HARDY, supra note Ill, at 1 I. 
157. Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 296. 
158. Id. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text. 
159. Id. 
160. Id. 
161. Article 54(2) of the Treaty of Rome, supra note 114,298 U.N.T.S. at 38, provides that, in order 
to implement this general program, or in the absence of such program, in order to achieve a stage in 
attaining freedom of establishment as regards a particular activity, the Council shall, on a proposal from 
the Commission and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee and the [Parliament] issue 
directives, acting ... by a qualified majority. Id. 
162. Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 300. 
163. 1968 (I) 0.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 65) 41 (special ed.). 
164. Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 301. Each member state has implemented the First Directive. 
165. 200.]. EUR. COMM. (No. L 26) 1 (1977). 
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the acquisition of assets. l66 The Third Directive,'61 adopted in 1978, regulates 
mergers. l68 The Fourth Directive '69 establishes the technical requirements for 
the publication of corporate data as mandated by the First Directive. 170 The Fifth 
Directive has not been issued yet. 171 In 1980, the Council approved the Sixth 
Directive '72 which provides a standard format for the prospectus a company is to 
issue on the first public offering of shares. 173 
Five directives in the company law harmonization program are yet not in 
force. The Fifth Directive, proposed in 1972, would apply the corporate gover-
nance system used in West Germany and the Netherlands to all EEC member 
states. 174 The Seventh Directive was proposed in 1976 and revised in 1978. It 
would regulate enterprises not covered by the Fourth Directive. '75 The Eighth 
Directive, proposed in 1978 and revised in 1979, relates to the qualifications of 
auditors. It would allow certain qualified auditors to practice in more than one 
member state. 176 The Ninth and Tenth Directives, yet to be proposed, would 
encourage parent companies to conclude "control contracts" with their sub-
sidiaries and would govern the dissolution of companies respectively.'77 
The five directives already enacted and the five awaiting enactment are similar 
to the insider trading harmonization effort '78 in that they are designed to ensure 
that people who deal with the business community in different EEC member 
states receive consistent treatment and enjoy essentially the same safeguards. 
B. Insider Trading and the Concept of Harmonization 
The EEC is currently deciding whether it should harmonize its member states' 
differing approaches to insider trading regulation through a directive. 179 The 
Commission is currently in the process of consulting each member state. 180 The 
EEC already has taken several steps relating to insider trading. Its most sig-
166. Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 303. Only the United Kingdom and France have implemented 
the Second Directive. 
167. 21 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 295) 36 (1978). 
168. Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 304. No member states have implemented the Third Directive 
despite the passing of the October 1981 deadline. 
169. 21 OJ. EUR. COM". (No. L 222) I (1978). 
170. Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 305. As of April 1982, the United Kingdom, Belgium, the 
Netherlands and Denmark had enacted implementing legislation. 
17!. See infra note 174 and accompanying text. 
172. 23 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 100) I (1980). See Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 305 n. 69. 
173. [d. at 307, 308. The Sixth Directive required implementation by September 1982. 
174. See Schneebaum, supra note 142, at 308-10 & nn.72-8!' 
175. See id. at 308-16 & nn.83-11!' 
176. See id. at 316-17 & nn.1l2-16. 
177. See Uf. at 317-21 & nn.1l7-42. 
178. See H. BLOOMENTHAI., supra note 19, at 1-99. 
179. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. 
180. 14 EC GEN. REP. ~ 210, at 121 (1980). 
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nificant undertaking is the European Code of Conduct 181 which the Commission 
recommended to the member states in 1977. Rule 9 of the Code, which relates to 
transactions in transferable securities, provides that a person coming into posses-
sion of price-sensitive information while carrying out the duties of his profession 
should refrain from trading in the security and making selective disclosure of 
such information. 182 
Since 1970, the Council of the EEC has also had a proposed statute for 
European companies under consideration. 183 This statute would require, among 
other things, that officers, directors, and shareholders owning ten percent or 
more of the company's stock report their stock ownership as well as any quarterly 
changes to their member states' supervisory body. The insider would also be 
liable to the company for any profits realized within a six month period on 
purchases, sales, or sales and purchases. 184 
The EEC has also adopted three directives in the securities markets field, all 
related to disciosure.185 The EEC justifies its work in this area as necessary to 
ensure the movement of capital, one of the aims set out in the Treaty of Rome. 186 
The creation of a common capital market for the Community is considered a 
prerequisite to the attainment of this aim. 187 The current policy of the Commis-
sion is to create this common capital market by encouraging greater investor 
penetration of the various national capital markets while simultaneously ensur-
ing that member states provide satisfactory standards of investor protection 
throughout the Community. 188 Accordingly, because insider trading legislation is 
a necessary component of any investor protection program, 189 it is appropriate 
for the EEC to harmonize the insider trading laws throughout the Community so 
181. OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L. 212) 37 (1977). 
182. /d. See aLw RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 268-71 for a complete discussion of the entire 
Code of Conduct. 
183. Council Regulation for Statute for European Communities, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C. 124) 
(1970). 
184. /d. at art. 82. This is very similar to section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.s.c. § 78p (1982). See 
supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text. 
185. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 356. Because an effective way of preventing insider trading is to 
shorten the period during which important information is known to only a few people, the EEC has 
instituted directives relating to prompt publication of price-sensitive information and to the publication 
of information on a regular basis. One directive provides that a listed company must "inform the public 
as soon as possible of any major new developments in its sphere of activity which are not public 
knowledge and which may, by virtue of their effect on its assets and liabilities or [financial position] or 
on the general course of its business, lead to substantial movements in the price of its shares." Council 
Directive, March 5, 1979, OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. L 100) I (1979). Another directive in this area mandates 
that companies whose shares are admitted to official listings publish information on a regular basis. 
1980 OJ. EUR. COMM. (No. C 335) 19. See Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 347. 
186. Treaty of Rome, supra note 114, arts. 67-73, 298 U.N.T.S. at 42-44. See supra note 153 and 
accompanying text. 
187. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. 
188. [d. 
189. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text. 
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that investors will feel protected from the abuse of insider trading and will 
therefore invest in the securities offered through the securities markets of the 
other member states. 190 
The directive on insider trading would not attempt to make the member states' 
laws identical. Rather, the aim of the directive would be to achieve an acceptable 
minimum standard of investor protection throughout the Community.191 The 
directive would contain general principles, but, like all directives, would leave 
each member state a great deal of flexibility in the implementation of the 
principles at the national level. 192 Member states with legislation that already goes 
as far as or further than the directive would not have to change their existing 
laws. 193 
V. CURRENT INSIDER TRADING LEGISLATION IN THE MEMBER STATES 
At present, only three of the ten member states of the EEC, the United 
Kingdom, France, and West Germany, have specific insider trading regula-
tions. 194 The Commission has looked into these countries' regulations and iden-
tified three problem areas that would be covered in the directive: the definition 
of "insider," the definition of "price-sensitive information," and the restrictions 
to be placed on insiders.195 Since each country's legislation varies, the Commis-
sion has drawn from each in considering what the EEC directive should contain. 
A country-by-country analysis under each problem area follows with reference 
to the EEC's position in that area. 
A. Definition of "Insider" 
1. The United Kingdom 
The British insider trading legislation 196 is by far the most lengthy and conse-
quently the most detailed of the legislation of the member states. 197 The British 
definition of insider is also the most inclusive. Under the Companies Act,198 an 
insider l99 is either an individual connected with a company,200 a government 
190. See Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. 
191. /d. 
192. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text. 
193. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. 
194. See supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text. 
195. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. 
196. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73. 
197. French legal scholar Andre Tunc notes that in France, the crime of insider trading was defined, 
and the punishment provided for, in a single sentence of twenty nine lines. The British Companies Act 
of 1980 devotes nine pages to the same subject. Tunc, supra note 21, at 762. 
198. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68-73. 
199. The term "insider" as used in this section refers to all persons to whom the restrictions of insider 
trading statutes extend. 
200. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 68. An individual is connected with a company if he is director of 
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employee who possesses unpublished price-sensItIve information201 about a 
company whose securities he wishes to trade,202 or an individual contemplating a 
take-over offer for a company.203 
In addition to these provisions regarding insiders, the Companies Act specifies 
that individuals who knowingly obtain, directly or indirectly, information from 
an insider are subject to the same restrictions204 as the insiders themselves if these 
individuals know or have reasonable cause to believe that the information is 
unpublished price-sensitive information, that the insider held this information 
by virtue of his position, and that the insider would reasonably be expected not 
to disclose it. 205 The people who get their information from insiders are known 
as ''tippees.''206 
The Companies Act also prohibits the insider from giving this unpublished 
price-sensitive information to another person if the insider knows or has reason-
able cause to believe that this other person will use the information to deal, 
counsel, or procure another person to deal in those securities on the London 
Stock Exchange.207 Under the British approach, a person who knowingly re-
ceives price-sensitive information from an insider and also uses this information 
to trade on the Exchange is also liable.208 
The British definition of insider is more inclusive then either the French or 
West German definition particularly because it includes tippees in the definition 
of insider. 
2. France 
Article 10-1, which was added to the 1967 insider trading statute,209 requires 
directors, certain officers, their spouses, and their dependent children to register 
their shares with the COB and prohibits them from engaging in insider trad-
ing.21o The article also prohibits "all other persons who, incidental to the exercise 
of their profession or function, make use of privileged information on the 
technical, commercial, or financial state of the company"211 from engaging in 
that company or another or employed with another company placing him in a professional or business 
relationship with the company to whose unpublished price-sensitive information he may reasonably be 
expected to have access and that he is not expected to disclose. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22 § 73(1). 
201. See infra notes 235-236 and accompanying text. 
202. Companies Act, 1980, ch.22, § 69. The British terminology for government employee is crown 
servant. ld. 
203. ld. at § 68(4). 
204. See infra notes 254-65 and accompanying text. 
205. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, §§ 68(3), 68(5), 69(1). 
206. See H. BLOoMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 6-48. 
207. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 68(6), 68(7). 
208. See also Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22 68(3),68(5). See also Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346-47. 
See also H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 6-48. 
209. Art. 10-1, supra note 15. 
210. ld. 
211. ld. 
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insider trading. As the legislation indicates, the French approach is to extend the 
definition of insider to include persons outside the company, such as bankers, 
attorneys, accountants, and government personnel, who come into contact with 
privileged information by reason of their profession. 212 The French legislation, 
unlike the British legislation, does not prohibit trading by tippees outside the 
insider's immediate family. An amendment to Article 10-1, first introduced in 
1980,213 may alleviate that deficiency by adding a prohibition against knowingly 
permitting another individual to carry out a prohibited transaction.214 This 
amendment still would not prohibit the tippee from trading on the inside 
information. 
3. West Germany 
The West German approach is the most inflexible of the three approaches in 
terms of the definition of insider. 215 Under the 1970 Recommendations,216 cer-
tain persons closely associated with their companies are listed as insiders; only 
those persons are subject to the restrictions of the recommendations. 217 Insiders 
are members of the management and supervisory boards, and employees who 
have access to certain classes of specified information.218 The company itself may 
decide whether an employee possesses sufficient access to sources of information 
to be classified as an insider. 219 Persons outside the company with inside informa-
tion are not covered by these recommendations. Tippees are also not treated as 
insiders under these recommendations. 22o 
Under the modifications of 1976, the concept of insider was expanded to 
include shareholders holding twenty-five percent or more of the company's 
stock.221 If the twenty-five percent shareholder is a company, the directors and 
legal representatives of the company's subsidiaries are also covered. 222 Certain 
outsiders may also be covered.223 
212. Address by G. Mourre, Second International Securities Law Conference (Apr. 3-4, 1975), 
reprinted in MULTINATIONAL ApPROACHES-CORPORATE INSIDERS 41, 46-47 (L. Loss ed. 1976). 
213. The National Assembly passed Bill 1080 and it is now under consideration in the Senate as 
Government Bill Senate 523, Bill 1080, art. 21, 1982 J.O. 5135, 5134 [hereinafter cited as Bill 1080]. 
214. Hawes, supra note 22, at 347. 
215. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 346. 
216. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
217. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 1-93. 
218. RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 245. See infra notes 246-51 and accompanying text for the 





223. For example, credit institutions, their directors, managers, and employees may be subject to the 
recommendations' prohibitions. [d. 
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4. EEC Sources 
Currently, the EEC's position is that a combination of the German and French 
legislation would be the most desirable in formulating a definition of "insider."224 
The EEC is considering a list of principal insiders which will be supplemented by 
a more general clause to cover abusive traders not mentioned in the list. 225 The 
majority of national experts in the Working Group considered the British ap-
proach, which includes tippees in the definition of insiders, too extensive. 226 The 
British legislation would still be permissible, however, even if the EEC directive 
encompasses the German and French approaches because their legislation goes 
further in protecting investor rights. 227 
All three member states currently include members of a company's board of 
directors in their definition of insider. The EEC also intends to include directors 
in the definition of insider. All three countries and the EEC include members of 
affiliated enterprises as wel1.228 The British, French, and the EEC definitions all 
cover individuals who come into contact with the information by reason of their 
profession.229 West Germany and the EEC specifically include controlling share-
holders in their definition.230 The EEC directive is the most explicit in labeling 
financial intermediaries, auditors, public officials,journalists, spouses, and other 
relatives as potential insiders.231 The British definition covers these people, if 
they receive the information from "an individual connected with a company," 
because it covers tippees.232 The French definition does not cover anyone who is 
not directly affiliated with the com pany, such as the spouse of an affiliated 
person or one who does not get the information by way of his profession.233 The 
West German definition only covers officers, major stockholders, and employ-
ees. 234 Because their definitions are less inclusive, the French and West German 
legislation will require some changes if the EEC's directive is enacted. 
B. Definition of "Price-Sensitive Information" 
1. United Kingdom 
The language in the Companies Act defining unpublished price-SenSItiVe 
information is quite general. Under section 73, unpublished price-sensitive in-




228. See Hopt, supra note 109, at 385-87, for a comprehensive chart comparing the German and 
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formation is specific information that relates directly or indirectly to specific 
matters relating or of concern to that company. In order to be classified as 
price-sensitive information, the information must be unknown to those persons 
who deal in those securities and the information must be such that it would be 
likely to affect the price of those securities. 235 By saying "of concern to that 
company," the statute does not appear to distinguish between market informa-
tion and material information acquired from a true insider.236 
2. France 
In France, the current legislation prohibits the use of privileged information 
on the technical, commercial, or financial state of the company.237 The French 
definition of price-sensitive information, therefore, has two elements: the infor-
mation must be privileged and it must refer to the technical, commercial, or 
financial state of the company. 23M With regard to the first element, the French 
courts have been strict in interpreting when the information is sufficiently public 
so as not to be privileged within the meaning of the statute.239 For example, 
French courts have held that information is privileged even if published in a 
periodical which has a small circulation and the company fails to issue a press 
release.24o Even published information, therefore, may still remain privileged. 
With regard to the second element, the Paris Court of Appeal stated that 
trading is only prohibited when the information is "precise, special and cer-
tain."241 Subsequent court decisions have demonstrated, however, that the stan-
dard is flexible. In one case, a person who obtained information when negotia-
tions were incomplete was held to have traded on privileged information because 
he had received the information at a time when negotiations were likely to result 
in the contemplated transaction. 242 In another case, however, the Paris Court of 
Appeal held that a bank officer did not trade on privileged information, when 
his knowledge consisted only of rumors. 243 The current amendment to Article 
10-1 would expand the definition of privileged information from information on 
the "technical, commercial, or financial state of the Company" to include any 
235. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 73(2). 
236. See Branson,lnsider Trading-The British Regulation in the Light of the American Experience (Pt.2), 
1982]. Bus. L. 413,414. Market information may be defined as information about the market for a 
company's shares rather than about the company itself, such as information received by an insider from 
a large brokerage firm's analyst who indicates that the firm is about to publish a favorable report on the 
company together with a "buy" recommendation. Federal Securities Code § 1603 comment 1(j) (1978). 
237. See supra note 18. 
238. Art. 10-1, supra note 15. 
239. Hawes, supra note 22, at 343. 
240. Judgment of 26 May 1977. Cour d'appel, Paris, 1978 Juris-Classeur Periodique [hereinafter 
cited as ].C.P. II] No. 18,789 (2nd case). 
241. Id. 
242. Judgment of 18 Apr. 1979, Trib. gr. inst., 1980 ].C.P. II No. 19,306 (2nd case). 
243. Judgment of 26 May 1977, Cour d'appel, Paris, 1978 ].C.P. II No. 18,789 (1st case). 
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information on the "prospects of the evolution of a security."244 Both market 
information and material information245 acquired by a true insider, therefore, 
would be covered under French law. 
3. West Germany 
West Germany's definition of price-sensitive information is quite specific. 
According to Rule 2(3) of the 1976 recommendations, inside information is 
defined as knowledge pertaining to unknown or known circumstances, which 
can be important for the evaluation of insider documents.246 This type of infor-
mation includes knowledge about changing dividends, substantial changes in 
earnings or liquidation, or other substantial circumstances which will bring about 
such changes.247 Inside information also includes knowledge of the following 
planned measures: capital reduction or the raiding of capital, the completion of 
a management or profit-sharing agreement, takeover or compensation offers, 
mergers, and liquidation.24M According to Note 3 of the Rule,249 it is not impor-
tant whether the information is confidential per se. 250 The important factor is 
whether it was available to the public when the insider used it. 251 
4. EEC Sources 
The EEC has settled provisionally on the definition that "unpublished price-
sensitive information means significant, confidential information relating to an 
undertaking which, if it were published, would be likely materially to affect the 
price of the securities of the undertaking concerned."252 The definition has 
similar elements, therefore, to both the French and British statutes in that the 
information must be material, it must relate specifically to the company, and it 
must be such that if published the price of the stock would move up or down.253 
The definitions of price-sensitive information are very similar among the three 
member states and the EEC. All of the definitions are broad and sweeping. The 
information must concern the company, have the potential to affect the price of 
the company's stock, and be either unpublished or unknown. Thus, should the 
EEC enact the directive, the British, French, and West German legislation would 
be left intact. 
244. Bill 1080, supra note 213. 
245. See supra note 236. 
246. RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 245. 
247. [d. 
248. [d. at 246. 
249. See supra note 18. 
250. RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 245. 
251. [d. 
252. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 347. 
253. [d. 
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C. Restrictions on Insiders 
1. United Kingdom 
The Companies Act prohibits insiders from dealing on the stock exchange in 
their company's securities if they possess what they know is unpublished price-
sensitive information. 254 In addition, insiders are prohibited from dealing in 
another company's securities if the unpublished price-sensitive information re-
lates to any actual or contemplated transaction between their company and the 
other company.255 The Act defines "dealing on the stock exchange in securities" 
as buying, selling, or agreeing to buy or sell any securities.256 The Act prohibits an 
insider from acting as a tippee,257 dealing as an off-market dealer,258 and creating 
a market259 in advertised securities.260 The prohibitions on counseling or procur-
ing another person to deal and on communicating information also extend to 
situations in which the individual knows or has reasonable cause to believe that a 
person will deal on a stock exchange outside of the United Kingdom. 261 The Act 
does not cover either direct dealings on a foreign stock exchange by an insider or 
any foreign off-market deals. 262 Some sort of international regulation, therefore, 
seems to be called for to cover these foreign transactions. 
The United Kingdom, unlike France, or even the United States, offers a 
statutory defense to liability.263 Under the Companies Act, the insider is not liable 
if he undertakes the transaction for some reason other than "with a view to 
making a profit or avoiding a loss."264 This provision is necessary to provide 
protection for those insiders who possess price-sensitive information but trade 
for innocent reasons such as wanting to liquidate their holdings because of an 
urgent need for money.265 
254. Companies Act, 1980, ch. 22, § 68(1). 
255. [d. § 68(2). 
256. [d. § 73(3). 
257. See supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text. 
258. An "off-market dealer" may be any licensed or exempted dealer in securities or a member of the 
Stock Exchange of a recognized association of dealers in securities. Companies Act, 1980, ch.22 § 70(3). 
259. "Creating a market in securities" is defined as an off-market dealer holding himself OUI as 
willing to buy and sell the securities outside of the Stock Exchange. !d. § 73(4). 
260. "Advertised securities" are securities listed on the Stock Exchange or securities for which price 
information has been published within the previous six months. [d. § 70(3). 
261. !d. § 70(2). 
262. Note, The Companies Act, 1980: Its Effects on British Corporate Law, 4 Nw. J. 1NT'L L. & Bus. 551, 
577 (1982). 
263. Hawes, supra note 22, at 347. 
264. Companies Act, §§ 68, 69. 
265. See CONDUCT OF COMPANY DIRECTORS, Cmd. 3, No. 7037, at 7. ~ 25 (1977). 
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2. France 
Article 10-1 makes it a crime for those people designated as insiders266 to 
engage in insider trading. 267 Insider trading encompasses the actual buying or 
selling of securities. The 1980 proposed amendment to Article 10-)268 would 
prohibit the insider from knowingly permitting another individual to carry out a 
prohibited transaction. 269 This same amendment would also make it a crime for 
individuals to engage in insider trading for a company.270 At present, French law 
does not regulate trading by individuals on behalf of companies or other en-
tities. 271 
3. West Germany 
According to Rule 1 of the 1976 recommendations, insiders must not engage 
in dealings with the help of inside information at any time, or under any 
circumstances, for their own benefit or for the benefit of a third party.272 Third 
parties include companies.273 The practice of tipping is not currently prohibited 
in West Germany.274 
4. EEC Sources 
The EEC's directive would impose three restrictions on insiders by prohibiting 
the use of price-sensitive information by the insider himself, prohibiting the 
insiders from recommending that third parties carry out transactions on the 
basis of inside information, and prohibiting insiders from disclosing information 
to third parties.275 The EEC experts would prefer to circumvent the problem of 
trading by tippees by prohibiting the insiders from disclosing the information 
rather than by preventing the tippees from trading.276 Also, because each EEC 
member state would be required to comply with the EEC's rules, there is no need 
for any express restrictions on trading on foreign exchanges. 
The British prohibitions are the most inclusive primarily because the Com-
panies Act expressly prohibits both tipping and dealing off-market within the 
266. See supra notes 209-14 and accompanying text. 
267. See Hawes, supra note 22, at 347. 
268. Bill 1080, supra note 213. 
269. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
270. Hawes, supra note 22, at 347. 
271. /d. 
272. RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 245. 
273. /d. 
274. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 1-94. 
275. Cruickshank, supra note 9, at 347. 
276. The EEC's approach, therefore, is distinguishable from the United Kingdom's approach in that 
the British regulations explicitly prevent tippees from trading. See supra notes 204-06 and accompany-
ing text. 
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United Kingdom. 277 Neither West Germany nor France presently prohibits tip-
ping, although the proposed French amendment on insider trading would pro-
hibit tipping. The EEC's directive would prohibit tipping. The West German, 
French, and EEC prohibitions are general in nature. They merely prohibit 
transactIons in securities using inside information. Because of the generality of 
their language, it is possible that off-market deals are also covered. 
VI. ENFORCEMENT OF INSIDER TRADING REGULATIONS 
The EEC's insider trading directive would require that each member state 
appoint a supervisory authority, preferably a public authority, to ensure com-
pliance with the Community legislation on insider trading. 27M Such authorities 
would also possess the appropriate powers of investigation in order to perform 
their duties. 
In the United Kingdom prior to 1978, the Takeover Panel usually imposed 
sanctions against inside traders. 279 The Companies Act abandons the enforce-
ment approach of the 1978 Companies BilJ280 which would have had the De-
partment of Trade investigate suspected insider trading. Instead, the Companies 
Act gives the investigative power to the police. 2M' At the present time, enforce-
ment policies are still evolving. Between 1980 and 1982 there have been only 
three prosecutions. In two cases the accused pleaded guilty and the third case has 
yet to be heard. 2M2 
In France, the COB is the agency in charge of controlling "the information of 
securities holders and the public on publicly held corporations and seeing to the 
proper functioning of the stock markets."283 In the ten years since insider trading 
became a criminal offense in France, the COB has conducted approximately 250 
investigations of suspected insider trading in which they have identified major 
buyers. 2M4 Prosecutions, however, have been relatively rare under the present 
law. As of October 30, 1980, only thirteen persons have been prosecuted for 
using privileged information.285 
277. See supra notes 257·58 and accompanying text. 
278. ld. 
279. Hawes. supra note 22. at 377. 
280. The 1978 Companies Bill was introduced by the Labor government in 1978. but failed to 
become law due to the change of government in May 1979. ld. at 338. 
281. Companies Act. 1980. ch.22. § 73(2). 
282. The Times (London). Aug. 25. 1981. at 15. col. 2; id .• Feb. 19. 1982. at 15. col. I. 
283. Order No. 67·833 of Sept. 28. 1967. at 1. 1967 D.S.L. 373. 1967 B.L.D. 659. 660. 
284. Lee. supra note 101. at 392. 
285. Tunc. Insider Trading in France 3 (Oct. 30. 1980) (paper delivered at the London Conference 
on New Trends in Company Law Disclosure) (copy on file at the offices of LAW & POLICV IN INTERNA' 
TtoNAL BUSINESS. Georgetown University Law Center. Washington. D.C.). All but one of those defen· 
dants were found guilty. /d. 
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Under the West German regulation, compliance is completely voluntary.2H6 
The Recommendations apply only to companies which have elected to subject 
themselves to the regulatory scheme.2~7 According to rule 5 of the 1976 Recom-
mendations, these companies can merely request that their employees accept the 
insider trading rules.2~~ Note 1 of Rule 4 of the 1976 Recommendations states 
that no legal or disciplinary action can be taken against the offender, although 
actions for breach of contract can be brought by the company against the 
insider.289 Enforcement in West Germany has also been hampered because, 
ordinarily, action can only be taken in the event of a complaint; the inquiry board 
has no real investigatory powers and must depend on information developed by 
the company's auditor. 29o Deterrence is weak since decisions are not published, 
and the harshest sanction merely requires an offender to turn over his profits to 
the corporation and pay the cost of the proceedings. 291 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The EEC, by the use of the Council directive, provides an appropriate and 
viable vehicle to harmonize existing insider trading legislation and to encourage 
cooperation among nations. The insider trading directive's basic significance is 
that it would be binding on all member states, thereby requiring member states 
to protect investors uniformly. Perhaps more importantly, the insider trad-
ing directive is desirable from two different perspectives. From the standpoint of 
the EEC, it will help to create the common capital market that the EEC's 
founders considered so necessary to achieve continued economic growth. From 
an international perspective, the insider trading directive is a crucial step in the 
move toward an international securities market. 
Members of the EEC believe that the goal of the freedom of movement of 
capital will only be obtained through the emergence of a common capital mar-
ket. 292 The insider trading directive will move the EEC one step closer to these 
twin goals by encouraging investors to trade and issuers to list their shares on 
foreign exchanges. 293 This movement of capital will provide the EEC member 
states with a more efficient and rational flow of capital to meet their needs.294 
286. See, e.g., H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19, at 1-93. Professor Michael Will of the University of 
Munich characterizes the system as a "toothless device." Id. 
287. Id. Currently the corporations that have agreed to be bound comprise approximately 90 percent 
of the capital of quoted corporations. Id. at 1-94. 
288. RIDER & FRENCH, supra note 19, at 246. 
289. /d. 
290. H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 19 at 1-94. 
291. /d. 
292. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text. 
293. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text. 
294. Aron, Europe's Many Markets, EUROPE 26, 26 (September-October, 1982). See Explanatary 
Memorandum to European Code of Conduct Relating to Transactions in Transferable Securities, 0.]. EUR. COMM. 
(No. L 212) 37 (1977). 
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This in turn will help the EEC to obtain its ultimate objective as set forth in 
Article 2 of the Treaty of Rome: the emergence of a genuine economic commu-
nity. 
The EEC's insider trading directive is also important from an international 
standpoint. It is a prerequisite to the formation of an international capital 
market. The major securities exchanges of the world are no longer solely na-
tional in scope; many companies are now able to gain access to multiple ex-
changes.295 Because companies may now be listed on exchanges in many differ-
ent countries, their insiders have more opportunities to use their price-sensitive 
inside information in fraudulent ways. This trend toward internationalization is 
likely to continue far into the future. 296 Insider trading, therefore, can no longer 
be dealt with on a purely nationallevel.297 The EEC's directive will transcend its 
member states' borders and hopefully will encourage cooperation among non-
member states. 29B 
The harmonization of securities laws alone will never bring about true integra-
tion of the securities markets. Indeed the problem of enforcement will continue 
to hamper this effort. Yet the EEC's efforts to harmonize the insider trading laws 
throughout its member states, even if useful only for providing investors with 
confidence in the markets, provide the foundation for future integration and 
therefore should be carried forward. 
Lisa A. Hedges 
295. In fact the EEC. by the use of a directive. has facilitated the admission of securities to multiple 
stock exchanges by harmonizing admission conditions throughout the Community. See Directive of 
March 5. 1979, coordinating the conditions for the admission of securities to official stock exchange 
listing. OJ. EUR. COMM .. (No. L 66) 21 (1979). Access to multiple exchanges offers many advantages: 
the issuer is able to broaden its ownership base and create a wider market for its securities. small 
investors are able to purchase the foreign issue more cheaply. investment by institutions and trustees is 
facilitated in those countries where these investors are prohibited by local law from purchasing shares 
other than on a local market. the issuer obtains public relations gains. and a local listing provides the 
foreign issuer with the local paper it may need for further acquisitions and financings. Cohen. supra 
note 1, at 371. 
296. Several factors indicate that the trend to an international market is likely to continue: the 
greater need for foreign capital (especially to finance the growth of multinational corporations). the 
continued expansion of international capital markets. and the increased interest. affluence. and mobil-
ity of individual investors. Cohen. supra note 1. at 358. 
297. Even the United States. which has the most sophisticated and extensive network of securities 
regulation. is unable to police most insider trading perpetrated by non-Americans due to subject-matter 
jurisdiction requirements. See supra notes 60-61. 66-67 and accompanying text. 
